This paper applies the theories of technological innovation to the process of technology transfer to biomedical and pharmaceutical start-ups. It is based on detailed data gathered from 26 firms, founded between 1968 and 1975 in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
Introduction: Transferability of Non-biomedical Research
The theories of technological innovation are not industry or technology specific, with only slight differentiation being made in the literature between technology-based industries such as semiconductors, computers, biotechnology, biomedical and pharmaceutical products, scientific and engineering instruments, and special manufacturing processes and materials, versus such basic industries as steel, textile, food, chemical industries, and agriculture.
The estimated volume of the U.S. biomedical and the pharmaceutical industry is quite significant, approximately 25 billion dollars in 1980 (Gibson et al., 1983; Frost and Sullivan, 1983) .
Despite this size, most of the research on technological innovation focuses on the non-biomedical industries. For instance Von Hippel (1977) studied the sources of innovation in the semiconductor and electronic subassembly processes, Freeman (1965) analyzed the R&D process in the electronic capital goods industry, and Tilton (1971) and Golding (as cited in Tilton, 1971 ) concentrated on the diffusion of technologies by using semiconductor technology as a case in point. Roberts (1968) studied the "spin-off" of new firms from MIT academic departments and laboratories, as well as government and industrial organizations. Knight (as cited by Von Hippel, 1982) used the data from the computer industry between 1944 and 1962 to describe the process of technological development. Research on innovations in scientific instruments (Von Hippel, 1977) and clinical chemistry analyzers (Von Hippel & Finkelstein, 1979) was more relevant to the biomedical industry, but it still did not address issues specific to it. More recently Horwitch (1982) presented biotechnology as a case in point of a field with high technological complexity.
On the other hand most of the studies of the biomedical industry are not based on theories of technological innovation. Coleman, Katz and Menzel (1966) , and recently Leonard-Barton (1983) studied the diffusion of innovations as a two-stage communication process. The studies of Ashford, Butler and Zolt (1977) , Young (1982) and Wardell (as cited in Roberts, 1981) focused on the pharmaceutical industry and the influence of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) on the industry's productivity and innovativeness. Another cluster of relevant research focused on the changes in the pharmaceutical industry, historically analyzing the interaction between technology and the regulatory environment (Temin, 1979; Fuchs, 1974; Measday, 1977) . They also address the economics of this industry. The analysis of medical innovations by Bernstein, Beaven, Kimberly, and Moch (1975, 79-114) focused solely on diffusion-relevant attributes of medical technology.
Only a few studies address the complex issues of technological innovation in the biomedical industry. Comroe and Dripps (1977) rigorously analyzed the relation between basic research and its application in two areas of medicine. The Committee on Technology and Health Care of the National Academy of Science (1979) provided rich conceptual background for the analysis of equipment-embodied technologies but still insufficient empirical data. In recent work Finkelstein and Homer (1984) used system dynamics to model the decision-making process of FDA policy makers in regulating emerging technologies.
The theories of technological innovation have not yet been tested extensively with empirical data from the biomedical industry.
But if this industry does not differ substantially from such industries as semiconductors or electronic instruments, we might assume that the theory will be still applicable to this context. Moskowitz, Finkelstein, Levy, Roberts and Sondik (1981) caution: "In understanding the stages of technological development in health, we can best benefit from previous research in other fields by carefully examining health-related patterns rather than quickly accepting the applicability of these findings to the health field" [our emphasis] (p.6).
The question of transferability becomes more acute in the face of some significant idiosyncracies of the biomedical industry (Moskowitz et al., 1981: 6-7) . First, the industry is heavily regulated by the federal government, especially by the FDA. The extent of this external interference and control of quality standards is overwhelming, including both the efficacy and the safety of the product (pars. 510-515, FDA, 1976) . The regulations also include directions about manufacturing and record-keeping procedures (par. 501), and labeling and advertising standards (par. 502). Both sets of standards are far more rigorous than standards which apply to nonbiomedical industries.
Second, the industry is supplying its products and technologies in a complex industrial goods market (Roberts, 1981) , in which medical practitioners serve as intermediaries between producers and ultimate users -the patients. It should be noted that in this industry, relative to others, many practitioners have closer relationships with researchers because they have the opportunity to interact in their natural work environment -the hospital. This is especially true for those practitioners who are associated with academic medical center "teaching hospitals". Third, the biomedical industry is an all-encompassing name for a wide variety of products, embodying such scientific and engineering disciplines as biology, anatomy, microbiology, physiology, electronic and mechanical engineering, material and computer sciences, and many others. The various configurations of these disciplines present a wide range of proximity to the clinical "core" of the industry. It is not clear what proportion of so-called biomedical firms produce diagnostic or therapeutic products of significance for the patient. How "medical" are these products, and to what extent are the idiosyncracies described above typical of them?
The best that can be done is to combine "...empiricism largely from nonbiomedical fields with speculations on the transferability of ideas to the biomedical area" (Roberts, 1981: 51) . The conceptual model presented by Moskowitz et al. (1981, 3-5 ) sets a structured research agenda for the biomedical field. This model ( Figure 1 ) consists of two distinct processes -the progression of technology from ideas to products and practices, and the interactions among people which facilitates this flow.
Figure 1 approximately here
The small and comparatively young biomedical firm, founded by an entrepreneurial individual or group with the explicit objective of commercializing a product or technological knowhow, in addition to being interesting for the understanding of formation of new enterprises, also represents the junction of these processes. As a research locus the small firm should also contain sufficient data about most of the sources which influence innovations listed by Roberts (1981) , such as staffing, idea generation and exploitation, and structural and strategic issues.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
The transfer of technology to the firm is a well-articulated area of the theory of technological innovation. The perspectives relevant to the analysis of the biomedical industry include the informational links between basic research and industrial research and development. These were established by Comroe and Dripps (1977) to be vital in some instances for the biomedical industry. Allen (1977) presented specific findings concerning the patterns of communication of scientists and engineers.
Mobility of personnel was found to be one of the most effective routes of technology transfer, both in the national and the international domains (Allen, Hyman, & Pinckney, 1983) . The studies of "spin-offs" by Roberts (1968) and Taylor (1981) address the same issues, having found that the intensity of technology transfer from the previous employer of the founders to the newly founded firm has been conducive to its commercial success.
A different question is whether technological advancement of the firm and its products contribute to commercial success. Several studies (e.g., Marquis & Meyers, 1969; Rothwell et al., 1974) found that valid understanding of customers' needs, and product ideas that were generated from market inputs led to better economic performance at the product level than "technology-push" products. The importance of users as sources of product ideas as documented by Von Hippel H4: High-technological sophistication of a firm's products does not necessarily result in its high economic performance.
Sample Selection and Data Collection
The sampling procedure used in this study differs to some extent from those used in prior studies of new firms (e.g., Roberts, 1968; Taylor, 1982; Utterback et al., 1983; Meyer and Roberts, 1984) .
Although our sample was clearly purposive, we attempted to make it as complete as possible.
Our assumption was that the data pertinent to our hypotheses would be available from firms with several specific attributes. First, the firms should be approximately one decade old, to allow sufficient time since incorporation so that their commercial performance is of a more stable pattern, after the initial start-up turmoil. On the other hand, to facilitate collection of first-hand data directly from the founders, the firms should not be older than 15-20 years, which age would increase the probability of founders' death or relocation, or of change of ownership since incorporation.
Second, the firms should have been formed for the purpose of doing business in the biomedical or the pharmaceutical industry, to present a more focused picture about young company operations in this specific area. Multi-product conglomerates clearly do not fit this requirement.
Third, to present as much as possible a comprehensive picture of the biomedical industry, the firms should be vertically integrated from R&D to marketing. Consequently, the firm should be an independent legal entity, not an R&D, manufacturing, or marketing arm of a larger corporation.
Adhering to the above criteria, the process of sample selection consisted of six stages:
1. Corporations whose names suggested either a medical, pharma- 2. To extent possible the founders of the remaining firms were located. It should be noted that firms that had been dissolved were not eliminated from the sample, though they were extremely difficult to trace. Inability to locate founders or firm resulted in over half of the drop-outs from the sample at this stage. Experience with prior studies of entrepreneurs suggests that most of these drop-out firms had never really been activated, despite incorporation.
3
. A structured interview was tested with four firms chosen from the target population, the questionnaire modified from earlier work by Roberts and Wainer (1971 ), Taylor (1981 ), and Utterback et al. (1982 . The main factors that were tested were the time required to complete the expanded questionnaire and the relevance and clarity of the new questions related to the medical context. Following initial testing the research instruments were finalized, consisting of a self-administered questionnaire that contained mainly well-structured and simple questions, and an interview questionnaire, containing unstructured or complicated issues which required real-time clarifications or explanations.
4. Efforts were undertaken to enlist the founders' agreements to participate. Among those who were not willing to participate at this stage the common explanation was "Don't want to talk". As much as the specific causes could be traced, they were usually "preoccupation with the current problems of the firm", or "the experience was too painful to walk through it again for research purposes".
These obstacles produced difficulties in obtaining information about the comparative performance or the product area of the firms which dropped out of the sample at this stage. As far as we can tell attrition biases are not significant. It is possible that the attrition of firms which were dissolved, or encountered severe operational difficulties, was comparatively high. At least one firm was under FDA investigation and was advised not to participate in the study for legal reasons. Drugs and pharmaceuticals were represented among the "drop-outs" (about 4-5 firms), but the distinction between medical devices and auxiliary products, based on the limited data in the State House objectives of incorporation, was more difficult to make.
5. The self-administered questionnaire was mailed to 32 founders of biomedical firms (excluding the pilot study), resulting in another 7 drop-outs for various reasons. Some of the reasons that were mentioned: "I'm too busy with my clinical research in X University"; "The firm does not exist anymore"; "The questionnaire is too long"; "He does not have the time, and he doesn't want to talk" (secretary); "Although I'm willing to participate, I'm leaving for business negotiation to Europe till the end of March".
There are no specific patterns of sample attrition at this stage, although again our data about the comparative economic success of drop-outs is incomplete. Of the drop-outs at least one firm has approximately 400 employees, and another is a successful producer of heart pacemakers. Two firms were active in the product area of drugs and pharmaceuticals and at least two were in auxiliary products.
6. Field interviews with 25 founders were conducted usually in their office. The founders of firms that were dissolved were interviewed at their homes or at the offices of their present employer.
Three additional firms were screened out of the sample, two of them due to confounded background or inadequate data and another because it had actually been incorporated in the early sixties. On the other hand, the firms included in the sample appear to be representative of the population of medical instruments firms as described by Dorfman (1982) and by Hekman (1980) . As also can be seen from the above anecdotal information about the reasons for selfelimination from the study, the firms that were excluded were of a broad range of sizes and of economic performances. (See Appendix B for sample attributes.) The breakdown by year of incorporation of the sample selection and the data collection stages is summarized in Table 1 . Table 1 were encoded as "high" on relevance and technological sophistication, those mostly from the public domain were encoded as "low", and the rest as "moderate" (see Appendix C-3 for relevant examples).
Product ideas predominantly from universities, inventions, or from research consultants were encoded as "high" on relevance and technological sophistication. Refinements of existing products or evolution from past work were usually encoded as "low", with the necessary correction for entrepreneur's professional and educational background, and the rest as "moderate" (see Appendix C-4 for relevant examples).
Results

Technology Transfer to the Small Biomedical Firm
Technology tranfer to the small firm takes place mainly in two forms: first, through personnel mobility, which carries the technological knowhow accumulated by the founders with their previous employers, during their education, and through their general experience. It can be described as a "spin-off" process, although in previous studies by Roberts and associates they used this term more specifically to describe transfer of technology from established technology-based organizations to new high-tech start-ups.
The second source of technology is the continuous flow of information from the firm's environment through both formal and informal channels, such as literature, personal contacts, professional conferences, vendors, users and suppliers. This area has been extensively researched and documented by Allen and associates. A comprehensive summary of relevant data is presented in Allen, Hyman and Pinckney, Table 7 (1983: 203).
Taylor (1981) showed that the knowhow gained at the previous employer of the founder was essential for the founding of the new firm. In our study 50% of the respondents indicated that their firm could not have been started without this technology; an additional 13%
indicated that an important aspect of the company's work originated at the previous employer (48% and 17%, respectively, in Taylor, 1981).
When we tried to trace the influence of the entrepreneur's background on the technological sophistication of firm's products, the following three components emerged as the most salient: It is reasonable to assume that the background of the founder is only one of the factors which contribute to the technology of the firm. The relations between the background of the founder and the technological attributes of the firm's products are all in the expected direction, although not statistically significant (Table 2) . According to the results presented in Table 3 , the participation of MDs in founding new firms works in the direction of facilitating technological innovation in the firm: its products tend to incorporate newer technologies, and have special specifications, but these relations again are only of marginal statistical significance. Another aspect of the technology transfer process is revealed by our data concerning part-time involvement in the firm's activities by these biomedical entrepreneurs (Table 4) . It seems that technologically more sophisticated products either required more preparatory time for R&D activities, or they were generated and exploited by entrepreneurs whose work environment (e.g. academic and R&D) permitted sufficient slack for their activities related to founding the new firm. In the face of our data related to the "spin-off" process of technology transfer, the latter explanation seems more plausible. Part-time involvement also indicates that the entrepreneur was continuously involved in both his "prior" job and his new firm over an extended time period. Table 4 approximately here
The second source of a product's technological attributes is the continuous flow of product ideas and technologies to be embodied in the final product. The data presented in Table 5 show that advanced sources of product ideas and technologies enhance technological Table 5 Table   6 show that firms which maintained even weak contacts with the clinical environment developed products that incorporated newer technologies and/or special specifications, and were of high perceived calibre. Table 6 The SAPPHO studies (Rothwell et al, 1974) On the other hand the relation between technological sophistication of a firm's products and its economic success (Table 8) is in the same direction as the SAPPHO results, although not statistically strong: technological sophistication of a firm's products might be a necessary but clearly an insufficient condition for economic success of the young biomedical firm. Table 7 , the impact of MDs as founders on economic success of the firm is mainly negative:
according to the results presented in Table 9 , MDs as entrepreneurs of new firms are associated with low performance as measured by average sales after approximately a decade of operation. Table 9 Still, the technological vitality of a technology-based firm proved to be implicitly relevant to its economic success. We found that for the firms which have not excelled economically only the initial, "spin-off" source of technology is a statistically significant (regression R 2 =0.25) determinant of their technology.
The obvious implication is that firms which do not maintain a continuous flow of input technology, to prevent the obsolescence of their original know-how base, cannot achieve significant economic success.
Summary
Although technology transfer to the new biomedical firm contains familiar components, such as the background of the entrepreneur and the "spin-off" effect, our data imply that the technology transfer process is quite specific in the biomedical field..
First, the hospital and the medical school are important specific sources of new product ideas and advanced product-embodied technologies. Second, the lag between founding the firm and its fullfledged operations is longer in comparison to the nonbiomedical firms, especially for those biomedical firms with more advanced products. On the other hand, it seems that high technological sophistication does not by itself determine commercial success. It is possible that the impact of the FDA regulations is stronger on novel and technologically advanced products, which might reduce their source firm's economic performance.
The issues related to operation of technology-based start-ups in a regulated environment is of relevance and interest to the study of biomedical and pharmaceutical firms. An article addressing these isssues is in preparation by the authors. 
